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Editorial
Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector
Data Redux
Christopher Kuner*, Fred H. Cate**, Christopher Millard**, and
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson***
In November 2012 we published a symposium issue
(volume 2, number 4 of IDPL1) containing a series of
papers analysing the laws and practices of nine countries
(Australia, Canada, China, Germany, India, Israel, Japan,
the UK, and the USA) relating to systematic government
access to personal data held by the private sector. Those
papers, developed as part of a multi-year project funded
by The Privacy Projects—a not-for-profit organization
dedicated to improving current privacy policies, prac-
tices and technologies through research, collaboration,
and education2—demonstrated considerable consistency
in the laws and practices of the nine countries examined.
According to a guest editorial that accompanied the
papers, common trends included:
† A ‘significant expansion in government demands for
private-sector data in general and for broad, systemat-
ic access in particular’, which the authors defined as
both ‘(1) direct access by the government to private-
sector databases, without the mediation or interaction
of an employee or agent of the entity holding the
data’, and (2) ‘government access, whether or not
mediated by a company, to large volumes of private-
sector data’.3
† A consistent lack of transparency about ‘not only the
activities, but even the laws concerning systematic
access to government data’.4
† A ‘surprising degree of commonality in the principles
and fundamental concepts reflected in the data
privacy laws of most of the countries surveyed’, in-
cluding the fact that ‘data collection for law enforce-
ment and national security are either exempted from
general data protection laws or constitute permissible
uses under those laws, subject to varying restrictions’.5
† Significant inconsistencies between ‘what the law says
and what the irrespective governments are reportedly
doing’.6
† The prevalence of ‘systematic volunteerism’—suggest-
ing that ‘the most frequent way that governments
obtain systematic access to private-sector information
is by asking for it’.7
Although published more than a year ago, those
papers proved remarkably prescient in light of the subse-
quent disclosures by Edward Snowden and others
during the past year about sweeping surveillance pro-
grammes in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The programmes disclosed seemed to bear out the
common themes previously identified, especially about
the intensity of government demands for private-sector
data, the lack of transparency about the surveillance, and
the wide chasm between what the laws (and govern-
ments) say and what really takes place.
In this issue we publish four additional papers, de-
scribing the laws and practices relating to systematic
government access to private-sector data in Brazil,
France, Italy, and the Republic of Korea. These papers
grew out of the second phase of the project supported by
The Privacy Projects and, like the first set of papers,
these were reviewed at a workshop of industry and aca-
demic experts prior to their publication here.
These four papers evince similar themes to those identi-
fied in 2012. The already broad requirements for industry
systematically to disclose wholesale information on its cus-
tomers and employees to support a wide variety of govern-
ment programmes is being supplemented, and in some
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cases outpaced, by government demands for systematic
access to such data for national security and law enforce-
ment purposes. The presence of sometimes vigorous
privacy laws seems to have little effect on this type of
access, either because national security and/or law enforce-
ment are exempt from those laws or because it appears
that the laws are not being followed.
In Brazil, for example, ‘Google was forced to sign an
agreement giving authorities a direct communication
channel with the company allowing officials to request
data retention, removal of content, and identification of
users’.8 In Italy, ‘“systematic” access to private data, al-
though starkly infringing on personal liberties, is in-
creasingly being favoured by the most recent legislation’.9
Perhaps the most striking examples of expanding
direct or unmediated access to broad swaths of personal
data held by the private sector come from France. French
law ‘not only requires telecommunications operators to
retain for one year traffic data (including location data
and Internet logs), but also requires hosting providers to
retain similar logs relating to persons who create or store
data using their hosting service’.10
French government officials have access to this and
other information through three different provisions of
national law. The first allows the government access to
traffic and location data from telecommunication opera-
tors for any ‘terrorism-related’ investigation with re-
course to the Commission on Security Interceptions, but
not to a judge.11 The second permits access to the same
data ‘in connection with potential national security
interceptions’ with recourse only to the Prime Minister’s
office.12 And the third, and most broad, authorizes the
government ‘to conduct generalized monitoring of the
radio transmissions in order to protect France’s national
interests’.13
This third avenue for ‘generalized monitoring’ without
oversight has generated considerable controversy in the
French press, and promises by the French parliament to
restrict this power. But as recently as 5 July 2013, Le Monde
reported that France’s external intelligence agency, the
Direction Ge´ne´rale de la Se´curite´ Exte´rieure: ‘collects tele-
phone data of millions of subscribers—the identifier of
the calling parties, of the called parties, the place, date,
duration and size of the message. The same thing exists for
e-mails (with the possibility to read the subject line of the
e-mail), SMSs, faxes . . . and all Internet activity that goes
through Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo!’14
According to the French Minister of Justice in 1991, gener-
alized monitoring of radio transmissions, which may be
conducted ‘without any authorization or ex post supervi-
sion’, ‘cannot be considered as a violation of the secrecy of
correspondence’.15 It is hard to distinguish this type of
signals intelligence gathering from that conducted by the
NSA which has understandably caused so much contro-
versy in Europe, except that the NSA had judicial author-
ization from the US Foreign Intelligence Court.16
As the four papers that follow make clear, the issues
raised by our 2012 articles on systematic government
access to private-sector data—given new urgency by the
disclosures by Edward Snowden and others over the past
nine months—remain real and relevant around the
globe. As the guest editorial that introduced the first set
of country-specific articles noted, ‘[s]ystematic govern-
ment access to private data thus goes far beyond a par-
ticular country and a particular intelligence agency’.17
We are grateful to The Privacy Projects; the organizers
of the second phase of its project on systematic govern-
ment access to private-sector data—James Dempsey, Ira
Rubinstein, and Ronald Lee; the authors of the four
papers that follow; and the participants in the workshop
who helped to review and critique the papers for their
collective efforts to expand our appreciation of the chal-
lenge we face.
The next issue of IDPL will feature a detailed analysis
by the organizers of all of the country-specific papers.
But while we work together to shine a light on the critic-
al challenges presented by systematic government access
to private-sector data and other forms of government
surveillance, there is urgent need for action. In a fall
2013 editorial, written in response to the Snowden dis-
closures, we stressed that:
[G]overnments are moving ahead with sweeping data gath-
ering and analysis initiatives while too much of our ap-
proach to data protection remains mired in the last century.
Indeed, there seems to exist a kind of ‘parallel universe’ con-
cerning the collection and sharing of electronic surveillance
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data for law enforcement purposes that operates independ-
ently of the regular legal standards for data protection. The
lack of any transparency concerning the operation of this
separate framework, and the justification for it, is worri-
some, to say the least. A serious dialogue about all of these
issues is essential if fundamental rights—to both privacy
and security—are to be protected and individuals through-
out the world are to have confidence in the rule of law.18
We can only reiterate that call today. The need to mod-
ernize data protection law and to bring national security
and law enforcement data collection squarely within its
purview grows more urgent with each passing day and
more necessary as our understanding of the breadth and
scope of the problem increases. Obviously, data collec-
tion and use for national security and law enforcement
presents special considerations that must be taken into
account, but those do not justify wholesale exemptions
from data protection laws or from the oversight that ac-
companies those laws.
Given the scope of the issue, we believe that action is
more likely to be effective if it is undergirded by thoughtful
dialogue across national borders involving data protection
officials, law enforcement and national security officials, in-
dustry leaders, and advocates. To date, the 13 countries
examined as part of The Privacy Projects’ work suggests that
no country is immune from the problem and no country
has found a perfect answer, but that there is a great deal to
be learned from our collective experiences. We can do
better, and we must. But as the four new papers we publish
in this issue make clear, it is high time we got started.
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